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ABSTRACT 
For a stochastic game with countable state and action spaces we proof 
that solutions in the game where all players are restricted to semi-Markov 
strategies are solutions for the unrestricted game. An example shows that 
while the unrestricted game is solvable we cannot always find solutions in 
the restricted game. 
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1 • INTRODUCTION 
The concept of a stochastic game was introduced by SHAPLEY [6]; his 
model belongs to the two person zero sum games. A two person non zero sum 
version was treated by ROGERS [5]; SOBEL [7] introduced the N-person stochas-
tic game. Due to different specifications for state- and action spaces there 
are many models refered to as a stochastic game. 
In this paper a stochastic game will be a discrete time dynamic system 
with a count~ble state space: {1,2, ••• }. At times 0,1,2, ••• players 
{1,2, ••• ,N} choose simultaniously an action out of a countable action space: 
{1,2, ••• }. If the system is in states at time t and the players choose 
actions a 1, ••• ,aN there will be a payment ri(s,a, ••• ,8N) to player i and 
the system has probability q(s' ls,a1, ••• ,8N) to be in states' at time t+l. 
Games with finite state space or finite action spaces for some players 
in some states can be viewed as a special case of this model, since we can 
enlarge the state or action spaces with a sequence of states or actions that 
are essentially the same as already existing states or actions. 
A strategy for player i is a mechanism for choosing actions in all 
t circumstances that can occur during the play. At every time t the states 
at time t and the history before time t (the sequence of states and actions 
choosen at times I, ... ,t-1) is known to the players. So the game is of 
perfect recall and by a result of AUMANN [1] for each strategy for a player 
we can find an equivalent behavior strategy. Let st be the state at time 
t and a~ the action choosen by player i at time t then a behavior strategy 
l. 
for player i TI. specifies for each t and each history 
t O O 1 0 I t-1 t . . . . . t t 
h = (s ,a1, ••• ,aN,s , ••• ,8N ,s) a probab1.l1.ty d1.str1.but1.on Tii(h) on the 
action space. TI~(alht) is the probability with which player i chooses action 
a at time t if ~istory ht2 occured. More formally TI. is a sequence TI!,TI:, ••• l. l. l. 
t where TI. is a mapping from the product set of tN+N+l times the positive 
l. 
integers to het set of probability distributions on the positive integers. 
A semi-Markov strategy for player i is a behavior strategy for which 
2 
t t t O t so 1rt.('ht) t O t 1r.(h) depends only on h through the ·s ands ; = 1r.(s ,s ). 
1 1 1 
A Markov strategy for player i is a semi-Markov strategy for which 
t O t O t O t t t 
.(s ,s) does not depend on s; so 1r.(s ,s) = 1r.(s ). 
1 1 1 
For each initial state s0 and each set of strategies 1r 1, ••• ,1rN for the 
players the game yields a stochastic process with rewards for the N players. 
Because for each player there will be realized a sequence of payments we 
have to specify a criterion. In the discounted game the criterion for player 
i will be 
or 
lim inf 
t I -+ex> 
lim sup 
t '-+<x> 
or any convex linear combination of lim sup and lin inf; where 
V~(s0 ,1r 1, ... ,1rN) is the expected payment to player i at time t and Se: [0,1) 
the discount factor. In the game with average return criterion: 
or lim inf or any convex linear combination of lim sup and lim inf. 
For E ~ 0 an g-equilibrium point of strategies given the criterion is 
* * a set of strategies for the players: 1r 1, ••• ,1rN such that: 
for all strategies 1r. 
1 
0 
for player 1, for all players i and for all inital states s • 
An 0-equilibrium point is called an equilibrium point. 
Using the approach of DERMAN and STRAUCH [3] in the Markov decision 
process (one person stochastic game), we investigate whether the players 
can restrict themselves to semi-Markov strategies. 
2. TWO PERSON ZERO SUM STOCHASTIC GAMES· 
We will 
0 
call the game a two person zero sum game if N = 2 and 
v1(s ,n 1,n2) = -
0 0 v2 (s ,n 1,n2) for alls ,n 1 and n2• If ·the limit in the 
3 
definition of V. 
1. 
a2 is sufficient 
always exists, r 1(s,a1,a2) = - r 2(s,a1,a2) for all s,a1 and 
for the game to be zero sum. In general this is not true. 
EXAMPLE 1. 
State space: {1,2, •• :}; in each state both players have only 1 action; if 
the state at time tis s then the state at time t+l is s+l with probability l; 
s 
r 1(s,l,1) = - r 2(s,l,l) = (-2) • 
The game is discounted with a=!, we take the lim sup for both players. 
t' 
(½)t(_2) t+l Vl(l,nl,n2) = lim sup I = 0 
t '-+<x> t=O 
t' 
(½)t(-2)t+l V2(1,nl,n2) = lim sup I = 2 
t '-+<x> t=O 
EXAMPLE 2. 
The game has one state where both players have 2 actions; whatever the actions 
chosen the game returns to the state with probability 1. in the next period; 
r,(1,1,1) = - r 2 (1,l,l) = 1, r 1(1,2,2) = - r 2 (1,2,2) = -1 all other rewards 
being zero. In symbolic notation: 
r 
- 1 
We consider the average return criterion with lim sup for both players. By 
cooperation both players can get an average reward l; for example by playing 
nn times action 1 followed by (n+l)n+l times action 2 etc. 
LEMMA. If for the -two pe:r>son zero sum game there exists an e-equiUb:r>ium 
point n~,n; for each£> 0 then the game is strictZy detePm'ined and the 
vaZue of the game is lime+O v1(s0 ,n~,n;) for any c:r>iterion. 
4 
PROOF. Since n~,n; is an e-equilibrium'point. We have: 




Q E, E, 0 0 E E 
so the sequence v1 (s ,n 11 ,n2 1 ) converges and V(s) = limeiO v1 (s ,n1 ,n2) 
exists. 
Fo~ each e > 0 there exists a o E (O,!e) such that 
and 
o o So n 1 and n2 are e-optimal strategies for player I and player 2 respectively 
and V(sO) is the value of the game. D 
3. EQUILIBRIUM POINTS OF SEMI-MARKOV STRATEGIES 
THEOREM I. Let n1, ••• ,nN be a set of behavior strategies for the players 
I, ••• ,N. If n. is a semi-Markov strategy for all j; i then there exists 
J 
a semi-Markov strategy n.sM for player i suah that: 
1 
0 for all times t, initial states s and players k. 
PROOF. Given initial state s0 and behavior strategies 1r 1, ••• ,1r~ let st be 
the random variable whose value is the state at time t and a~ the random 
-1 
variable whose value is the action chosen by player i at time t. 
5 
For each set of strategies for the players and each initial state we 
have a corresponding probability measure on the space of sequences of states 
and actions that can be realized. As a-field structure for this space we 
take the a-field generated by finite sequences of states and actions. 
Let Pso denote the probability measure corresponding to·1r 1, ••• ,1rN as 
strategies and s0 as initial state. 
P ( t t v· t t = 0 a.=a .. J ;~ =s s -J J 
P ( t ti t t v. 4 • t t) P Ct t v. 4 . t t) 0 a.=a. a.=a. Jri;s =s • 0 a.=a. Jr1;s =s • -1 1 -J J - -J J -s s 




and a.~, given 
-J 
s 0 and st with j 1 i are independent, so 
t t . t 't t t t t t t t t 
~ p o(a.=a. VJ;S =s) = p o(a.=a.js =s ) 0 P o(a.=a. Vj,/:i;_s =s) (*) 





as follows: if initial state is s0 and the state at time t is i/ 
. t . h b b · 1 · p ( t t I t t) action a. wit pro a 1 1ty O a.=a. s =s • 1 S -1 1 -
* Let P O denote the probability measure on the sequences of states and 
s 
actions if player i . h h. SM sw1tc es is strategy to 1r .• 
1 
We will show by induction with respect tot that 
* t t . t t p o<a.=a. v,;s =s) = 
-J J ~ -
s 
t t· v· t t) P 0 (a.=a. J;_! =s . 
s -J J 
This equality is easily checked fort= O; suppose it holds fort= T then 




Since the players j,;. i play semi-Markov strategies we have 
P* ( T+I_ T+I U'4" T+I T+I) 
0 a. -a. vJr1;~ =s = s -J J 
P ( T+I_ T U'4]• T+I_ T+I) 
0 a. -a. v Jr , s -s • -J J -s 
The equality fort 
equality(*). 
Since 
= T + 1 then follows from the definition of TI~M and 
1 
this proves the theorem. D -
THEOREM 2. If for any criterion TI7, ••• ,TI; is an e-equiZibrium-point·in th~ 
game where aZZ players are restricted to pZay semi-Markov strategies then 
TI7, ••. ,TI; is aZso an e-equiZibrium point for that criterion. 
6 
PROOF. Vi(s0 ,TI 1, ••• ,TIN) is some function of the V~(s0 ,TI 1, ••• ,TIN), t = 1,2, ••• 
By theorem 1 for each behavior strategy TI. there exists a semi-Markov strategy 
SM 1 TI. such that: 
1 







s • * * therefore 1T 1,.,.,1TN is an e-equilibrium point. □ 
However the existence of an e-equilibrium point does not imply the 
existence of an e-equilibrium point in the restricted game. The following 
example is a two person zero sum game that is strictly determined and whose 
restricted game is not. 
EXAMPLE 3. This example is due to GILETTE [4] and BLACKWELL and FERGUSON [2] 
showed that starting in state I the game is strictly determined with value 
½. Blackwell and Ferguson called this game "the big match"; we write it in 
symbolic notation: 
The stochastic game has state space: {1,2,3}; in state I both players have 
action space: {1,2}; in state 2 and 3 both players have action space: {I}. 
If in state both players choose action I then one unit is payed by player 2 
to player I and the next state is state I with probability 1. etc. If the 
game is in state 2 or 3 both players have only one action available and the 
game stays forever in that same state. We consider the average return cri-
terion with lim sup for player I and lim inf for player 2. 
In this example the set of semi-Markov strategies is the same as the 
set of Markov strategies. Blackwell and Ferguson used non-Markov strategies 
for player I, dependent on the actions taken by player 2 in the past, to 
8 
show that the game starting in state I ·is strictly determined. However if 
the players stick to (semi-)Markov strategies the game is not strictly de-
termined. Stochastic games where the players are restricted to semi-Markov 
strategies can be considered as repeated games with incomplete information. 
ZAMIR [8] gives an equivalent example. We show that player I has no e-optimal 
strategies fore<½. 
I 2 · 
PROOF. Let w = (w ,n , ••• ) be a Markov strategy for player I that is e-opti-
mal (wt is the probability of choosing· action I at time t); pt the probability 
that player I chooses action 2 for the first time at time t 
the probability that player not always chooses action 1. 
o t 0 
tco t 
and p = lt=I p 
For each o > 0 there exists a t such that : t lt=l 
strategy p for player 2 as follows: choose action 
t > 1' p - p-u. We construct a 
0 at time 1, ••• ,t and 
action 2 thereafter. If player 1 plays n and player 2 plays p the game re-
duces to a stochastic process that realizes exactly one of the following 
events: 
1 • player uses action 2 before time t 0+1 
2. player uses action 2 for the first time at t 0+1 or thereafter 
3. player never uses action 2. 
The probability that the first event occurs is at least p-o and the average 
return in this case is O. The second event has probability at most o and 
average return 1. The third event has probability 1-p and average return O. 
So the overall average return.is at most o. 
The value of the restricted game, if it exists, is the same as the 
value of "the big match" by theorem 2 and the lemma. If e <½then choose 
o < ½-e; this contradicts the fact that w is an e-optimal strategy for player 
I. D 
REFERENCES 
[1] AUMANN, R.J., Mixed and behavior strategies in infinite extensive games, 
in Advances in game theory, pp 627-650, M. Dresher, L.S. Shapley 
and A.W. Tucker eds., Princeton university press (1964). 
9 
2 BLACKWELL, D. & T.S. FERGUSON, The big match, Annals of Math. Stat. 39, 
pp 159-163 (1968). 
3 DERMAN, c. & R.E. STRAUCH, A note on memoryZess ruZes for controZZing 
sequentiaZ controZ processes, Annals of Math. Stat. 37, 
pp 276-278 (1966). 
4 GILETTE, D., Stochastic games with zero stop probabiZities, in Con-
tributions to ·the theory of games 3, pp 179-187, M. Dresher, 
A.W. Tucker and P. Wolfe eds., Princeton university press (1957). 
5 ROGERS, Ph.D., Non zerosum stochastic games, Berckeley ORC 69-8, 
april 1969. 
6 SHAPLEY, L.S., Stochastic games, Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 39, 
pp 327-332 (1958). 
7 SOBEL, M.J., Noncooperative stochastic game, Annals of Math. Stat. 42, 
pp 1930-1935 (1971). 
8 ZAMIR, s., On the notion of vaZue for games with infiniteZy many stages, 
The Annals of Statistics 1, pp 791-796 (1973). 
